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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD A. RICHE, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
Professional Corporation, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT 
COURT OF APPEALS NO: 
860099-CA 
SUPREME COURT NO: 
880443 
(CATEGORY NO. 13) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3} (a) and Rule 43 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals was entered on October 27, 1988. This Court granted 
Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari by an Order 
dated January 11, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the 
Trial Court's judgment for reasons somewhat different than 
those relied on by the Trial Court by finding that the Stock 
Redemption Agreement, although valid, was inapplicable 
because of an involuntary transfer and a subsequent disqual-
ification allowing the professional corporation to be 
dissolved under the Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13. 
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STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-7 of the Utah Professional 
Corporation Act provides: 
A professional corporation may 
issue the shares of its capital stock 
only to persons who are duly licensed to 
render the same specific professional 
services as those for which the corpo-
ration was organized. A shareholder may 
voluntarily transfer his shares in a 
professional corporation only to a 
person who is duly licensed to render 
the same specific professional services 
as those for which the corporation was 
organized. Any shares issued in vio-
lation of this section are void. 
Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13 of the Utah Professional 
Corporation Act provides: 
The articles of incorporation may 
provide for the purchase or redemption 
of the shares of any shareholder upon 
the death or disqualification of such 
shareholder, or the same may be provided 
in the by-laws or by private agreement. 
In the absence of such a provision in 
the articles of incorporation, the 
by-laws, or by private agreement, the 
professional corporation shall purchase 
the shares of a deceased shareholder or 
a shareholder no longer qualified to own 
shares in such corporation within 90 
days after the death of the shareholder 
or disqualification of the shareholder, 
as the case may be. The price for such 
shares shall be their reasonable fair 
value as of the date of death or dis-
qualification of the shareholder. If 
the corporation shall fail to purchase 
said shares by the end of said 90 days, 
then the executor or administrator or 
other personal representative of a 
deceased shareholder or any disqualified 
shareholder may bring an action in the 
district court of the county in which 
the principal office or place of prac-
tice of the professional corporation is 
located for the enforcement of this 
provision. The court shall have power 
to award the plaintiff the reasonable 
fair value of his shares, or within its 
jurisdiction, may order the liquidation 
of the corporation. Further, if the 
plaintiff is successful in such action, 
he shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorneyfs fee and costs. 
The professional corporation shall 
repurchase such shares without regard to 
restrictions upon the repurchase of 
shares provided by the Utah Business 
Corporation Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Dr. Richard Nilsson is a medical doctor who has been 
practicing medicine in Ogden, Utah, since 1958 (T. 452) and 
subsequently joined in practice with Dr. Chauncey 
Michaelson, becoming partners in 1961. In 1970 they formed 
the corporation known as North Ogden Professional Corpo-
ration, the Petitioner herein. The corporation issued to 
Dr. Nilsson 1,000 shares of stock in the Petitioning corpo-
ration, having a par value of $1.00 per share and redemption 
value of $1,000.00. (R. 120) The relevancy of the aforesaid 
facts and the facts stated infra, is that the entire matter 
before this Court evolves around the 1,000 shares of stock 
issued to Dr. Richard Nilsson. 
Dr. Richard Nilsson filed a Chapter 13 Petition in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, 
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Northern Division, No. B76-633, seeking a Chapter 13 ar-
rangement. (R. 118) 
The filing of the Chapter 13 arrangement was frustrated 
primarily by the present Respondent, Edward A. Riche, and as 
a result thereof, a Chapter 7 Petition was filed, which, in 
accordance with the Bankruptcy Act, and also in accordance 
with the present Bankruptcy Code, refers the date of the 
filing of the Chapter 7 to the date of the original filing 
of the Chapter 13. 
On the filing of the Chapter 7, the Bankruptcy Court 
appointed Attorney James E. Davis as Trustee on behalf of 
the Court, and it was the duty of the Trustee to obtain for 
the benefit of creditors, all of the assets of the bankrupt 
petitioner which were not exempt under the exemptions 
provided for by the State of Utah. (R. 118-119) 
At the time of the formation of the North Ogden Profes-
sional Corporation in 1970, a Stock Redemption Agreement was 
executed by the corporation and its shareholders. (Peti-
tioner's Exhibit 28D) 
The record before the Court evidences that Dr. Chauncey 
Michaelson, a medical doctor and shareholder, made a bid to 
the Court for the purchase of the 1,000 shares of stock of 
Dr. Nilsson, in accordance with the Stock Redemption 
Agreement entered into between the parties at the time of 
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the formation of the corporation in 1970, and the Court, in 
accordance with the Bankruptcy Act, put the stock up for 
sale, fully advising all persons present as to the nature of 
the interest they were purchasing from the Court. (R. 
242-243) 
Notwithstanding the offer and tender of $1,000.00 by 
Dr. Chauncey Michaelson, a medical doctor and shareholder in 
the Petitioning corporation, made to the Bankruptcy Court, 
the Court authorized the sale to the Respondent of whatever 
interest the Trustee had in the corporation, subject to the 
Repurchase Agreement and applicable Utah law. (R. 243) The 
Respondent subsequently filed an action to liquidate the 
Petitioning corporation, seeking to assert the shareholder's 
right because of a purchase made frcm the Bankruptcy Court, 
even though a private agreement was known to the Respondent 
as set forth in Exhibit 28D, and even though the Articles of 
Incorporation (R. 174) evidences in paragraph XII thereof 
the qualifications of a person who may be a shareholder. 
The District Court held that the Respondent was the 
sole owner of all rights, title and interest in 1,000 shares 
of the Petitioner, that the Respondent's demand for redemp-
tion had a reasonable fair value, was made timely under the 
terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement and/or the pro-
visions of the Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13, that the 
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Defendant did not take the appropriate steps for redemption 
under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, nor did 
the Petitioner comply with the terms of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 16-11-13. The Petitioner was ordered to immediately 
dissolve its corporation and marshal all assets, provide for 
all legal liabilities, with the balance of the assets to be 
distributed to the shareholders in the same ratio as their 
respective stock ownerships as reflected at trial, and 
finally, that the Respondent was awarded Court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the 
Trial Court erred in finding that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement was ambiguous and went on to hold that the Stock 
Redemption Agreement was not ambiguous with respect to the 
meaning of par value since "par value" is a term of art and 
the document which should state par value, did so unambigu-
ously. The Utah Court of Appeals further found that the 
Stock Redemption Agreement did not contain "extensive 
notices" or "procedural steps" which were in any way incon-
sistent with "par value" meaning par value. But the Utah 
Court of Appeals did go on to hold that for reasons somewhat 
different than those relied on by the Trial Court, that the 
Trial Court decision should be affirmed. 
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First of all the Utah Court of Appeals held that the 
Articles and Stock Redemption Agreement, although prohibit-
ing the transfer of stock to anyone who is not a member of 
the medical profession, did not preclude the transfer in 
this case in that this transfer was an "involuntary" trans-
fer resulting in a disqualification of the individual 
holding the stock and because the Stock Redemption Agreement 
allowing for restrictions did not address "involuntary" 
transfers during life but only applied in the event of death 
or voluntary transfers such that and once the stock was 
acquired by an involuntary transfer resulting in ownership 
by a disqualified person, the only remedy is to compel 
dissolution of the corporation pursuant to the applicable 
statute, to-wit: Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13. 
The Utah Court of Appeals found as a second matter that 
the Trial Court's judgment was readily sustainable by 
further finding that "since the corporation did not provide 
in its Articles, in its By-Laws, or by private agreement for 
the repurchase or redemption of shares upon the disquali-
fication of a shareholder, the statutory procedure set forth 
in Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13 would govern the repur-
chase or redemption of shares in this case." The redemption 
value under that statute would be the reasonable fair value 
as of the date of death or disqualification of the 
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shareholder and liquidation of the corporation would follow 
should the corporation fail to purchase the shares by the 
end of the 90 day period. 
During the end of November, 1988, the Petitioner did 
Petition this Court for the granting of a Writ of Certiorari 
from the Court of Appeals to the Utah Supreme Court. On 
January 11, 1989, this Court did grant a Writ of Certiorari 
from the Utah Court of Appeals to this Court for review 
under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court of Appeals did err in sustaining the 
Trial Court's judgment by entering different and separate 
findings that the Stock Redemption Agreement, although 
valid, was inapplicable because of an involuntary transfer 
and the subsequent ownership of the professional corpo-
ration's stock by a disqualified shareholder when in fact 
the Stock Redemption Agreement did cover this type of 
transfer by operation of law meaning the disqualified 
shareholder held the stock subject to the Stock Redemption 
Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN SUSTAIN-
ING THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT FOR 
REASONS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT THAN THOSE 
RELIED ON BY THE TRIAL COURT BY FINDINC 
THAT THE STOCK REDEMPTION AGREEMENT, 
ALTHOUGH VALID, WAS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE 
OF AN INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER AND A SUBSE-
QUENT DISQUALIFICATION ALLOWING THE 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION TO BE DISSOLVED 
UNDER THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 
16-11-13. 
Professional corporations as pointed out by the Court 
of Appeals are unique in some respects in that they are 
designed to allow "members of certain professions the 
opportunity to practice together and enjoy the tax and other 
advantages of the corporate form." Central State Bank v. 
Albright, 737 P.2d 65, 66 - 67 (Ct. App. 1987). See also 
Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-3, (1987) "[Legislation extend-
ing the power to incorporate to professionals seeks to 
assure that corporate control will remain with persons" 
licensed in the profession, and bound by the same profes-
sional standards and ethics, by restricting the sale or 
transfer of stock to members of the profession." Central 
State Bank v. Albright, 737 P.2d 67. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in this case did find con-
trary to a finding of the Trial Court that the Professional 
Corporation Act read in conjunction with the Utah Business 
Corporation Act provides that the Petitioner's Articles of 
Incorporation would be the appropriate vehicle for defining 
the par value of the stock and that the definition of par 
value in the corporation's Articles is in effect 
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incorporated into the Stock Redemption Agreement and that 
the Stock Redemption Agreement was not ambiguous with 
respect to the meaning of par value since "par value" is a 
term of art and the document which should state the par 
value did so unambiguously. Edward A, Riche v. North Ogden 
Professional Corporation, Case No. 860099-CA, page 4. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to find as to the second point 
that the agreement did not contain "extensive notices" or 
"procedural steps" which were in any way inconsistent with 
"par value" meaning par value* Such that the Utah Court of 
Appeals found that the Stock Redemption Agreement was 
appropriate and the par value of $1.00 per share would be 
appropriate for a "voluntary" transfer during life or upon 
death of a qualified stockholder. 
After the Court of Appeals found that the Petitioner's 
Stock Redemption Agreement could be given the plain meaning 
and the use of par value of $1-00 per share, it found that 
the Stock Redemption Agreement was not applicable because 
the transfer in this case through purchase or sale of the 
corporate stock through a bankruptcy proceeding to a 
non-medical or disqualified person was actually an "involun-
tary" transfer, and subject to the stock restriction. 
Castonquay v. Castonquay, 306 NW.2d 143, 145 (Minn. 1981) 
was cited by the Court of Appeals as foundation which held 
that a stock restriction did not apply to a Court ordered 
assignment pursuant to judgment of divorce and for further 
reference the Court of Appeals cites to the Massachusetts 
case of Durkee v. Durkee Moore, Inc., 428 NE.2d 139, 142 
(Mass. 1981). 
Both of these cases cited by the Court of Appeals show 
that stock restrictions did not apply to Court ordered 
assignments pursuant to a judgment of divorce. Reference to 
those cases would bear out that an assignment of stock as an 
equitable division of marital assets in a divorce case is 
not deemed a "sale" but rather an assignment by operation of 
law due to the equitable powers that the courts have in a 
divorce action to make an equitable division of a husband 
and wife's estate and to assign any part of one's property 
to the other, and that stock restrictions on sale or sale 
upon execution are inapplicable to Court ordered assignment 
pursuant to a judgment of divorce. Durkee Id. at page 143. 
Durkee did go on to find that the spouse receiving the 
stock by assignment through the divorce cannot transfer the 
stock free of the corporation's charter restriction, but 
merely that the Court's transfer order by operation of law 
is not subject to the restriction, meaning that the spouse 
although receiving the stock by assignment rather than by 
"sale", was not subject to the restriction, but any 
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subsequent transfer would be subject to the restriction. 
This case does not address the issue of voluntary or invol-
untary, but rather points out the fact that in a divorce 
action under a divorce court's powers of equity, stock can 
be awarded free of restrictions between spouses. A closer 
review of those two cases would also indicates that these are 
not cases dealing with professional corporations resulting 
in a disqualification or a prohibition against transfer of 
property from a professional to a non-professional. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 as in Durkee provides the 
Trial Courts of this state with equitable powers to make a 
division of property. But in the immediate case at hand 
this did not involve a divorce or a transfer of property 
involuntarily by assignment by Order of the Court, but 
instead involved the actual sale of property in a trustee's 
sale in the United States Bankruptcy Court authorizing the 
sale of Dr. Nilsson's shares in the Petitioner corporation 
to the Respondent for the sum of $2,600.00 as the highest 
bidder. The Bankruptcy Court in no way ruled on the validi-
ty of the transfer or value of the stock and expressly made 
the sale "subject to" any applicable restrictions in the 
Stock Redemption Agreement and Articles of Incorporation and 
all applicable provisions of State law. This sale was an 
actual sale at a trustee's auction bringing monies into the 
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estate of Dr. Nilsson who had voluntarily filed a bankruptcy 
subjecting himself and his non-exempt assets of his estate 
to the disposition of the United States Bankruptcy Court. 
The Stock Redemption Agreement provided a restriction 
concerning transfers upon the death of the shareholder or a 
voluntary transfer during his life and if either of those 
events were met then the stock could be repurchased by the 
professional corporation at the par value of $1.00 per share 
which has been found by the Court of Appeals to be a reason-
able redemption amount as properly dictated by the Articles 
of Incorporation and the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
With the transfer by sale in the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court of the stock in question, the corporation was 
improperly denied its right under the Stock Redemption 
Agreement to purchase the stock from the Respondent at a par 
value of $1.00 per share or $1,000.00, such that the issue 
of the disqualification due to the transfer by sale in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court is a point that should have 
never been reached because par value had already been 
established through the Stock Redemption Agreement which was 
applicable in this situation. 
A case more in point would be that of Renberg v. 
Zarrow, 667 P.2d 465 (Okl. 1983) that Court held as follows: 
Absolute restrictions forbidding the 
alienation of corporate stock are 
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invalid, but reasonable restrictions are 
not. The usual purpose of shareholders 
agreements which restrict the sale of 
corporate stock is to prevent transfers 
to outsiders without first providing an 
opportunity for the shareholders to 
acquire the stock. 
That Court went on further to hold: 
...an executor's title to corporate 
stock in an estate is acquired by 
operation of law [emphasis added], and 
further transfer of the stock either to 
specific legatees or to others is 
subject to transfer restrictions imposed 
by stockholders agreement. 
This would imply outside of a divorce action proceeding 
that even with the acquisition of stock by operation of law 
or through a probate proceeding that those individuals are 
subject to transfer restrictions imposed by the stockholders 
agreement. 
The Oklahoma statute 18 Okl. St. Ann,, § 809 dealing 
with the issuance and transfer of stocks is essentially, 
especially in the pertinent sections, identical to that of 
the Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-7. The Oklahoma statute 
reads as follows: 
Section 809. Issuance and transfer of 
stocks. 
A professional corporation may 
issue the shares of its capital stock to 
persons who are duly licensed to render 
the same professional services or 
related professional services as those 
for which the corporation is organized. 
A shareholder may voluntarily transfer 
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his shares in a professional corporation 
to a person who is duly licensed to 
render the same professional services or 
related professional services as those 
for which the corporation is organized. 
Any shares issued in violation of this 
section are null and void... 
The Oklahoma statute 18 Okl. St. Ann. § 815 dealing 
with the issuance and transfer of stocks is essentially, 
especially in the pertinent sections, identical to that of 
the Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13. The Oklahoma statute 
reads as follows: 
Section 815. Death or disqualification 
of shareholders—Sole shareholder 
The certificate of incorporation 
may provide for the purchase or redemp-
tion of the shares of any shareholder 
upon the death or disqualification of 
such shareholder, or the same may be 
provided in the bylaws or by private 
agreement. In the absence of a pro-
vision for the same in the certificate 
of incorporation, or the bylaws, or by 
private agreement, the professional 
corporation shall purchase the shares of 
a deceased shareholder or a shareholder 
no longer qualified to own shares in 
such corporation within ninety (90) days 
after the death of the shareholder or 
disqualification of the shareholder, as 
the case may be. The price for such 
shares shall be the book value as of the 
end of the month immediately preceding 
the death or disqualification of the 
shareholder. Book value shall be 
determined from the books and records of 
the professional corporation in accor-
dance with the regular method of ac-
counting used by such corporation. If 
the corporation shall fail to purchase 
said shares by end of said ninety (90) 
-15-
days, then the executor or administrator 
or other personal representative of the 
deceased shareholder or any disqualified 
shareholder may bring an action in the 
district court of the county in which 
the principal office or place of prac-
tice of the professional corporation is 
located for the enforcement of this 
provision. If the plaintiff is success-
ful in such action, he shall be entitled 
to recover the book value of the shares 
involved and a reasonable attorney!s fee 
and costs. The professional corporation 
shall repurchase such shares without 
regard to restrictions upon the repur-
chase of shares provided for in the 
Oklahoma General Corporation Act.... 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to find in its 
holding that the transfer of stock through the probate was 
an involuntary transfer due to a transfer by operation of 
law, therefore denying the application of the stock repur-
chase agreement but quite to the contrary found that even 
though the stock had been transferred by operation of law, 
that stock once in the hands of the new owners was still 
subject to transfer restrictions imposed by stockholders 
agreement. 
The Respondent may attempt to point out that the 
corporation in Renberg v. Zarrow is not a professional 
corporation and therefore has a different application. The 
case as cited by the Utah Court of Appeals as mentioned 
earlier also did not involve professional corporations with 
- i fi~ 
the automatic stock restriction by statute to ownership 
being held only by professionals. 
As the Petitioner argued in its Petition for the 
granting of a Writ of Certiorari, the actual restriction 
terms that should be argued are not the restriction terms of 
a prohibition against transferring professional corporate 
stock from a qualified to an unqualified individual who is 
not a practicing professional, but rather to use the terms 
of the Stock Redemption Agreement which indicate that any 
stockholder desiring to sell, encumber or otherwise dispose 
of his stock (not referring to qualified/unqualified profes-
sional or unprofessional) shall first offer all that stock 
to the company at par value as being the actual stock 
restriction that would be in effect as relates to the 
Respondent's acquisition by either voluntary transfer, 
involuntary transfer or operation of law of Dr. Nilssonfs 
stock. The central issue is whether or not the Stock 
Redemption Agreement does apply in regards to a limitation 
on an individual qualified/unqualified professional or 
non-professional which requires the owner of that stock to 
first offer that stock for purchase to the professional 
corporation at the designated par value. As described 
earlier, the Utah Court of Appeals did find that the Stock 
Redemption Agreement defining the term par value was correct 
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so that the only question left to resolve is whether or not 
that Stock Redemption Agreement is applicable. If applica-
ble, the Respondent as an owner of the stock has an 
obligation to first of all offer that stock for sale to the 
professional corporation at the par value and only then if 
•che professional corporation under the Stock Redemption 
Agreement fails to repurchase the stock should the owner be 
allowed to proceed under the Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13 
which once again would allow the professional corporation to 
purchase the shares of a shareholder no longer qualified to 
cwn shares in the corporation within ninety (90) days after 
the disqualification. The only difference would be this 
time the price to be paid would be the reasonable fair value 
as of the date of disqualification rather than the par value 
under the Stock Redemption Agreement. If at that time the 
corporation failed to pay the reasonable fair value, then 
the disqualified shareholder could bring an action in the 
district court for dissolution of the corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the 
par value would be the appropriate redemption amount to be 
paid pursuant to the Stock Redemption Agreement, but did err 
in finding that the Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-7 dealing 
with the professional nature of a professional corporation 
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and its use of the word "voluntarily" would mean that the 
sale of professional stock at a United States Bankruptcy 
trustee sale is an involuntary transfer of stock by opera-
tion of law and therefore would not be considered in the 
Stock Redemption Agreement, thereby stepping out of the 
parameters of the Stock Redemption Agreement, avoiding its 
application and resulting in the application of Utah Code 
Annotated § 16-11-13 allowing for a reasonable par value as 
of the date of the disqualification of the shareholder as 
the appropriate purchase price. Rather, the appropriate 
application would be the application of the Stock Redemption 
Agreement for a redemption of the stock by the professional 
corporation at the par value of $1.00 a share or $1,000.00, 
which was timely tendered by the corporation to the new 
shareholder who took the stock from the United States 
Bankruptcy trustee's sale subject to the Stock Redemption 
Agreement. To allow otherwise would force the liquidation 
of a professional corporation resulting in unjust enrichment 
to the Respondent above and beyond the $2,600.00 tendered 
for the purchase of the professional stock. 
DATED this / & day of February, 1989. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Edward A. Riche, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
North Ogden Professional 
Corporation, a Utah 
professional corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860099-CA 
F I L E D 
ORME, J u d g e : 
fezyT Nooran 
:'erk of the Court 
Otah Court of Appeals 
Defendant, North Ogden Professional Corporation, appeals 
from a district court judgment ordering its dissolution. The 
corporation seeks reversal of the judgment and enforcement of its 
claimed right to redeem certain shares of its stock held by-
plaintiff Edward Riche. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On June 8, 1970, three medical doctors, Dr. Richard Nilsson, 
Dr. Chauncey Michaelson, and Dr. David Paul, formed defendant 
corporation under the Utah Professional Corporation Act. Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-11-1 to -15 (1987). The corporation's articles of 
incorporation authorized the issuance of 50,000 shares of stock 
with a par value of $1.00 per share. The corporation issued 
1,000 shares to Dr. Nilsson, 1,000 to Dr. Michaelson, and 10 
shares to Dr. Paul. The articles of incorporation restricted the 
transfer of stock, permitting transfer only to other members of 
the medical profession. On July 1, 1970, the shareholders and 
the corporation entered into a stock redemption agreement, which 
also restricted the transfer of stock and gave the corporation a 
right of first refusal should any shareholder desire to dispose 
of his stock and the option to repurchase its stock at par value 
in the event of the death of a shareholder or upon a 
shareholder's termination of employment by the corporation. 
Dr. Nilsson became involved in several unsuccessful 
investments, culminating in his filing for bankruptcy in 1976. 
On November 20, 1981, the bankruptcy trustee applied to the 
bankruptcy court for authorization to sell Dr. Nilsson1s 1,000 
shares of stock in the corporation to Dr. Michaelson for $1,000. 
This amount represented the par value of the shares and the 
amount for which the corporation would be entitled to redeem the 
shares, pursuant to the stock redemption agreement, in the event 
it were entitled to redeem. Riche, a creditor of Dr. Nilsson 
holding a judgment for $120,000.00, objected and asked the 
bankruptcy court to require the trustee to force a dissolution of 
the corporation so that Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy estate could 
receive his share of the total assets of the corporation. 
The bankruptcy court rejected both suggestions. Instead, 
the court authorized a sale of the stock to the highest bidder 
and, on August 12, 1982, conducted a sale of the stock. The 
bidding proceeded in stages until Riche bid $2,600 and Dr. 
Michaelson refused to make a higher bid. The court authorized 
the sale of Dr. Nilsson*s shares to Riche for that amount. In 
doing so, the bankruptcy court in no way ruled on the validity of 
the transfer or value of the stock and expressly made the sale 
"subject toM any applicable restrictions in the stock redemption 
agreement and articles of incorporation and all applicable 
provisions of state law. 
Upon sale of the stock to Riche, the corporation tendered 
$1,000 to Riche, the par value of the shares of stock purchased 
from the trustee, in contemplation of the stock redemption 
agreement. Riche rejected the tender and made demand upon the 
corporation for the issuance of the 1,000 shares of stock, 
redemption of his shares in the corporation for their fair market 
value, a corporate financial statement, and an opportunity to 
inspect a copy of the corporate minutes, bylaws, and articles of 
incorporation. The corporation refused to comply with Riche's 
demands and reiterated its perceived right to repurchase the 
stock at par value. 
Riche then filed an action in district court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-13 (1987), which provides that, absent a 
redemption provision to the contrary, a professional corporation 
has 90 days within which to purchase the shares of a disqualified 
shareholder at their "reasonable fair value." Absent such 
purchase, an action may be filed to obtain the "reasonable fair 
value" of the shares or the corporation's dissolution. Id. 
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Following trial, the court found that once Riche purchased 
ajl the rights, title, and interest that Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy 
estate had in the 1,000 shares of stock, Riche was entitled, 
under both the stock redemption agreement and § 16-11-13, to have 
his shares redeemed for their reasonable fair value. The court 
found that dissolution was the only viable solution. It ordered 
defendant corporation to be immediately dissolved and to have all 
its assets marshalled, its legal liabilities paid, and the 
balance of its assets distributed to the shareholders in the same 
ratio as their respective stock ownerships. The court also 
entered judgment against the corporation for reasonable attorney 
fees as required by the statute. See id. 
On appeal, the corporation argues that the court erred in 
ordering its dissolution because it had a right to redeem its 
stock pursuant to the stock redemption agreement and its articles 
of incorporation. It claims that Riche, as someone who is not a 
member of the medical profession, was entitled to $1,000, the par 
value of the shares, and not the reasonable fair value of the 
shares. 
The corporation also argues that § 16-11-13 only applies in 
the absence of a private agreement and that since the corporation 
provided for the redemption of shares in its stock repurchase 
agreement, the statute is inapplicable.1 
STOCK REDEMPTION AGREEMENT 
The court found that Riche purchased the stock subject to 
the provisions of the stock redemption agreement. The court 
noted that the agreement protected the doctors from undesirable 
associates, namely non-doctors, by prohibiting the sale or 
transfer of stock to anyone who was not a member of the medical 
profession. However, the court found the redemption agreement to 
be ambiguous in at least two respects:2 (1) It did not define 
1. Each party also asserts statute of limitations arguments 
against the other. We agree with the trial court that these 
contentions are without merit. 
2. When a contract is ambiguous and the trial court proceeds to 
find facts respecting the intention of the parties based on 
extrinsic evidence, our review is limited, Kimball v. Campbell, 
699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985), and we will not disturb the findings 
and judgment so long as they are based on Hsubstantial, 
competent, admissible evidence." Car Doctor Inc. v. Belmont, 635 
P.2d 82, 83-84 (Utah 1981). However, the threshold question of 
whether or not a contract actually is ambiguous is a question of 
law. Faulker v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). 
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the redemption price in that "par valueM was not given a 
numerical value in jbhe agreement, and (2) its elaborate 
provisions governing notices and procedures were Mwholly 
inconsistent with valuing Dr. Nilsson's interest at only 
$1/000M; therefore, the parties must not have really meant Mpar 
valueM in the technical sense with respect to the redemption 
arrangement contained in the agreement• We disagree. 
As to the first point, the Utah Business Corporation Act 
provides that the articles of incorporation shall set forth the 
classes of shares and state their par value. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10-49 (1987). The Professional Corporation Act provides 
that Harticles of incorporation shall meet the requirements of 
the Utah Business Corporation Act.M Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-4 
(1987). Therefore, under the Professional Corporation Act read 
in conjunction with the Utah Business Corporation Act, 
defendant's articles of incorporation would be the appropriate 
vehicle for defining the par value of the stock. The 
definition of par value in the corporation's articles is, in 
effect, incorporated into the stock redemption agreement.3 
The stock redemption agreement was not ambiguous with respect 
to the meaning of par value since Hpar value" is a term of art 
and the document which should state par value did so 
unambiguously. 
As to the second point, we frankly do not find in the 
agreement "extensive notices" or "procedural steps" which are 
in any way inconsistent with "par value" meaning par value. It 
is true the agreement gives the corporation the option of 
paying the par value redemption over the course of a year, 
which seems peculiar in the instant case where only $1,000 
would arguably be payable. However, the articles authorized 
3. [W]henever "two or more instruments are executed by the 
same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the 
course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject 
matter," courts should interpret them "together so far as 
determining the respective rights and interests of the parties, 
although they do not in terms refer to each other." Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271 
(1972). 
the issuance of 50,000 shares. A schedule of payments seems 
unnecessary if the corporation need pay only $1,000 to redeem, 
but it would be quite important if all the authorized stock 
were issued and $25,000 or so had to be paid to redeem a 
shareholder's stock. This possibility, not an aberrant notion 
of Mpar value," appears to explain this provision. Nor has 
Riche called to our attention any evidence that would support 
the trial court's conclusion that the corporation really meant 
something other than par value when it used that term in the 
stock redemption agreement. 
It does not follow, however, that the court's judgment 
was in error. For reasons somewhat different than those relied 
on by the trial court, its judgment is readily sustainable.4 
STOCK RESTRICTIONS 
Professional corporations are unique in some 
respects.5 They are designed.to allow "members of certain 
professions the opportunity to practice together and enjoy the 
tax and other advantages of the corporate form." Central State 
Bank v. Albright. 12 Kan. 2d 175, 737 P.2d 65, 66-67 (Ct. App. 
1987). See Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-3 (1987). " [Legislation 
extending the power to incorporate to professionals seeks to 
assure that corporate control will remain with persons" 
licensed in the profession, and bound by the same professional 
4. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 
894-95 (Utah 1988). 
5. This court recently confronted another aspect of their 
uniqueness, which results from the Professional Corporation 
Act's "purpose of making available to professional persons the 
benefits of the corporate form for the business aspects of 
their practices while preserving the established professional 
aspects of the personal relationship between the professional 
person and those he serves." Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-3 (1987). 
See Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(shareholder in law firm organized as professional corporation 
not vicariously liable for malpractice committed by another 
shareholder unless personally involved in malpractice). 
Although the Court's order or some notice thereof has not been 
published, we are advised the Utah Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari in Stewart v. Coffman. 
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standards and ethics, by restricting the sale or transfer of 
stock to members of the profession. Central State Bank v. 
Albright, 737 P.2d at 67. 
In this case, state law, the corporation's articles, and 
the stock redemption agreement all prohibit the transfer of 
shares in the corporation to persons not licensed in the 
medical profession. Section 16-11-7 of the Utah Professional 
Corporation Act provides: 
A professional corporation may issue the 
shares of its capital stock only to 
persons who are duly licensed to render 
the same specific professional services as 
those for which the corporation was 
organize^. A shareholder may voluntarily 
transfer his shares in a professional 
corporation only to a person who is duly 
licensed to render the same specific 
professional services as those for which 
the corporation was organized. Any shares 
issued in violation of this section are 
void. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-7 (1987) (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the corporation's articles of incorporation 
provide: 
The transfer and conveyance of this stock 
shall be restricted in that such stock may 
be issued, sold or transferred only to a 
person or persons who are duly licensed to 
render medical services; any other 
transfer or issuance of shares shall be 
void. 
The corporation's stock repurchase agreement contains an 
equivalent restriction. 
Although the statute, the articles, and the agreement 
prohibit the transfer of stock to anyone who is not a member of 
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t*3 medical profession, these prohibitions did not preclude the 
transfer in this case. Restrictions on the sale of corporate 
stock are held to apply only to "voluntary" transfers. See, 
e_. jLt_, Castonauav v. Castonguav, 306 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Minn. 1981) 
(Ltock restrictions did not apply to court-ordered assignment 
pursuant to judgment of divorce). Indeed, this doctrine has 
apparently been incorporated in § 16-11-7, quoted above, which 
expressly refers only to voluntary transfers." 
The same result is reached in this case by giving the 
corporation's stock repurchase agreement its plain meaning. The 
agreement does not even purport to restrict involuntary transfers 
of stock, such as the one in the instant case which occurred 
pursuant to a court-ordered trustee's sale. See Durkee v. Durkee 
Mower, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Mass. 1981). The restrictions 
in the stock redemption agreement only concern (1) transfers upon 
the death of a shareholder and (2) voluntary transfers during 
life. The agreement simply does not address involuntary 
transfers during life.6 w[T]he scope of the restriction cannot 
be greater than its actual language." Durkee v. Durkee-Mower, 
Inc., 428 N.E.2d at 142. Accordingly, H[w]e refuse to expand the 
clear and unambiguous language of the corporate stock restriction 
and hold it applicable to a situation not provided for when 
drafted." Id-
Once a disqualified person,7 like Riche, acquires stock by 
an involuntary transfer, the usual remedy is to compel 
dissolution of the corporation pursuant to the applicable 
statute. See generally Gulf Mortgage & Realty Investments v. 
Alten, 282 Pa. Super. 230, 422 A.2d 1090, 1095-96 (1980). 
STATUTORY SCHEME 
A professional corporation may provide, through its articles 
of incorporation, bylaws, or private agreement, for the 
repurchase or redemption of shares upon the death or 
disqualification of a shareholder. Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-13 
(1987). In the absence of such a provision, the repurchase or 
redemption of shares must be accomplished pursuant to the 
statutory scheme provided in § 16-11-13. 
6. Accordingly, we need not reach the question of whether, and 
to what extent, intended restrictions on involuntary transfers 
might be enforceable. 
7. "Qualification" and "disqualification" refer, in this sense, 
to whether a shareholder is qualified to hold stock in the 
professional corporation, i.e., whether he or she is duly 
licensed as a member of the profession. 
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In this case, the corporation's articles merely recited that 
the statutory scheme would govern in the event of death or 
disqualification of a shareholder• However, the corporation 
subsequently entered into an agreement providing for the 
redemption at par value of shares held by a shareholder at death 
or upon a shareholder's termination of employment* The agreement 
does not provide for redemption in the event of disqualification, 
whether following the involuntary transfer to an unqualified 
person or the subsequent disqualification of a formerly qualified 
shareholder.8 
Since the corporation did not provide in its articles, in 
its bylaws, or by private agreement for the repurchase or 
redemption of shares upon the disqualification of a shareholder, 
the statutory procedure set forth in § 16-11-13 governs the 
repurchase or redemption of shares in this case. That provision 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
[T]he professional corporation shall 
purchase the shares of a deceased 
shareholder or a shareholder no longer 
qualified to own shares in such 
corporation within 90 days after the death 
or disqualification of the shareholder, as 
the case may be. The price for such 
share[s] shall be their reasonable fair 
value as of the date of death or 
disqualification of the shareholder. If 
the corporation shall fail to purchase 
said shades by the end of said 90 days, 
then . . . any disqualified shareholder 
may bring an action in . . . district 
court . . . for the enforcement of this 
provision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-13 (1987). The statute further authorizes 
the court to order the liquidation of the corporation, id., which 
was done in this case. 
8. An unqualified transferee is treated the same as a 
once-qualified shareholder who becomes disqualified. See also 
Street v. Suaerman, 202 So.2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967). See also 
Note 7, supra. 
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The judgment appealed from was properly entered and is 
affirmed. 
Gregory KX&rnterT^uHgB-
WE CONCUR: 
CVZ'JLJ e£L±L^ 
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district 
court herein be, and the same is, affirmed. 
Opinion of the Court by GREGORY K. ORME, Judge; RICHARD C. 
DAVIDSON and REGNAL W. GARFF, Judges, concur. 
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IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JDWARD A. RICHE, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
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TORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL 
ZORPORATION, a U t a h P r o -
f e s s i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n , 
Defendant, 
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The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
on July 3, 1984, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting 
without a jury, with John P. Sampson appearing as attorney for 
the plaintiff and Herschel J. Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck, 
Jr. appearing as attorneys for the defendant. 
Trial was then conducted upon the issues raised in 
plaintiff's complaint and defendant's answer. 
Wherefore, the Court having heard the evidence, and 
finding the evidence sufficient to warrant judgment in favor 
of plaintiff, and having made and entered its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, now gives judgment: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff, 
Sdward A. Riche, is the sole owner of all rights, title and interest 
in the 1,000 shares of North Ogden Professional Corporation 
stock. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
plaintiff's demand for redemption at a reasonable fair value 
//as made timely under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement 
and/or the provisions of Code Section 16-11-13. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant did not take the appropriate steps for redemption under 
the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, nor did the defendant 
comply with the reasonable terms of Code Section 16-11-13. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant 
corporation be ordered immediately dissolved in that plaintiff, 
along with an appropriate representative of the remaining shareholders, 
are hereby ordered to marshall all assets, provide for all legal 
liabilities, and the balance of said assets to be distributed 
to shareholders in the same ratio as their respective stock 
ownerships were reflected at trial: Dr. Michaelson, 1,000 shares, Dr. 
Paul, 10 shares, and plaintiff, Edward A. Riche, 1,000 shares. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plain-
tiff is awarded judgment for court costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees as determined by affidavit and agreement among the parties' 
counsel. / /) ,•» 
Dated t h i s y / day of *>Sepbejrtiber , X?nAl—^ 
/jOHN F,'WAHLQUIST/ DISTRICT JUDGE I 
• 2 -
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postage prepaid, to Herschel J. Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck, 
Jr., WATKISS & CAMPBELL, 310 South Main Street, Suite 1200, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and to Pete N. Vlahos, VLAHOS, 
PERKINS & SHARP, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD A/ RICKE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah Pro-
fessional corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86158 yj\ 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
on July 3, 1984, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting 
without a jury, with John P. Sampson appearing as attorney for 
plaintiff and Herschel J. Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck, 
Jr. appearing as attorneys for defendant. This was an action 
brought by plaintiff to obtain an accounting and order of dissolu-
tion of defendant corporation pursuant to Utah Code Section 
16-11-13. The Court having heard and examined the evidence, 
both oral and documentary, introduced by the parties hereto, 
having heard the arguments of counsel, and having taken the 
matter under advisement for the purpose of consideration, now 
finds and decides as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant's articles of incorporation, retirement 
plan, leases and the stock redemption agreement were prepared 
by Attorney Paul Hansen. They were executed on or about the 
dates generated. 
2. The defendant is a legal, bona fide professional 
corporation under the laws of the State of Utah and is and was 
recognized as such in the community for the purpose of providing 
medical services in exchange for fees charged and collected. 
3. Said corporation was created and structured primarily 
for tax purposes. 
4. The defendant corporation has considerable assets 
in the form of leases, furniture and fixtures, office equipment, 
medical paraphernalia and all accounts receivable generated 
by the services of past and present corporate employees and/or 
the professional corporations of Dr. Michaelson and Dr. Nilsson. 
Notwithstanding the validity to the general public of the defend-
ant corporation, the two doctors as between themselves, did 
not regard the formal paperwork of the corporation as a change 
in their relationship. Among themselves, each doctor understood 
he would claim from the corporation his receivables and one-
half of Dr. Paul's generated receivables after all normal operating 
costs were paid. 
5. The Articles of Incorporation provide that 50,000 
shares might be issued. The corporate records show that as 
of the date of Dr. Nilssonfs bankruptcy the following shares were 
outstanding: Dr. Nilsson, 1,000 shares, Dr. Paul, 10 shares, 
and Dr. Michaelson, 1,000 shares. 
6. This Court finds that there were no formal shareholder 
meetings and/or director meetings. 
7. Since incorporation, the entire receivables generated 
by the services of Drs. Michaelson, Nilsson and Paul and/or 
their related professional corporations, are the properties 
of the defendant. Said doctors have been paid a fixed wage 
or draw, but that said wage or draw was calculated to be less 
than their respective billings, so that there would be sufficient 
funds for other corporate purposes such as retirement plans 
and appropriate bonuses. 
8. Dr. Michaelson and Dr. Nilsson owned in North Ogden 
certain real property held in a partnership. This improved 
real property was the facility in which the corporation conducted 
its business. The lease was adjusted from time to time in order 
to affect the most desirable tax results for the two doctors. 
Dr. Paul did not enjoy the benefits of ownership in the real 
property. 
9. Initially the defendant corporation provided a retire-
ment plan for Dr. Nilsson and subsequently retirement plans 
were arranged for both doctors through their individual professional 
corporations. All business transactions between the various 
entities and doctors were always considered in connection with 
their respective tax consequences and the creditor problems 
of Dr. Nilsson. Examples of such planning and close association 
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between the two principal doctors are as follows: (1) A partner-
ship practice prior to incorporation; (2) The formulation of the 
defendant corporation; (3) the formation of the real estate 
partnership; (4) the formation of individual retirement plans; 
(5) the formation of individual professional corporations, 
and (6) assistance and protection Dr. Michaelson gave Dr. Nilsson 
by purchasing delinquent trust deed notes on Dr. Nilsson's home 
and other real estate interests. Dr. Nilsson's individual examples 
consisted of the following: (1) His sale to his retirement 
fund of his coin collection, which cost him $130,000 for $30,000. 
This resulted in a tax loss in 1974 and substantial economic 
benefits to his retirement fund and further avoidance of his 
creditors. (2) Just prior to have had placed substantial judgments 
against Dr. Nilsson, he granted substantial trust deeds on his 
home and other real estate holdings to favored parties. (3) 
Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy schedules listed individual assets 
at inordinately low values. 
10. Years prior to bankruptcy, 1973, Dr. Nilsson 
reported substantial income and net v/orth in excess of $1,400,000. 
At the conclusion of the bankruptcy, the Trustee reported to 
the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he had only been 
able to obtain less than $4,000 in assets. Two Thousand Six 
Hundred Dollars of that amount came from the plaintiff because 
of the purchase of the North Ogden Professional Corporation stock. 
11. Ken Jensen's records and exhibits are accepted 
by the Court with regard to the collectability, and receivable 
-4-
amounts generated by the respective employees throughout the 
relevant period of the corporation's existence. 
12. All the evidence of this case taken as a whole 
warrants a finding of fact that Dr. Nilsson and Dr. Michaelson 
have jealously attempted to promote one another's well being. 
Further, that there is .no evidence of a falling out or opposing 
positions taken by Dr. Nilsson and/or Dr. Michaelson with regard 
to one another and their respective welfare. The evidence is 
actually to the opposite in the extreme. Insofar as Dr. Michael-
son is concerned, his efforts appear to be totally honest. 
13. The Stock Redemption Agreement provided that 
Dr. Nilsson and Dr Michaelson would be protected from undesirable 
associates under the terms and conditions as provided by the 
Agreement. 
14. The Court finds, however, that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement is ambiguous in at least two respects: (1) The Agree-
ment does not define the purchase price of the disposing partner's 
interest in that par value is not delineated with a numerical 
value. (2) The extensive notices, procedural steps, payment 
schedule and options available among the parties to the Stock 
Redemption Agreement are wholly inconsistent with valuing Dr. 
Nilsson's interest at only $1,000. 
15. All of the evidence, including but not limited 
to the jealous attempts on the part of the doctors to promote 
one another's welfare, their various interrelated business leases 
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and agreements, retirement plans, and the mutual understanding 
between the doctors relating to individual receivables leaves 
this Court to conclude and find that a disposing shareholder 
was to be dealt with equitably under the terms of the Stock 
Redemption Agreement. Therefore, this Court finds that par 
value, as defined for purposes of the Redemption Agreement, 
meant market value. 
16. Although the Redemption Agreement provides for 
notices and procedural steps, no such steps or procedures were 
followed or taken by defendant. 
17. Dr. Richard E. Nilsson filed bankruptcy on July 8, 
1976. 
18. July 8, 1976, is the effective date that all 
of Dr. Nilsson ls interest: in the 1,000 shares, including the 
rights, privileges and values of the North Ogden Professional 
Corporation stock became subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Bankruptcy Court and the Trustee subsequently appointed. 
19. On August 12, 1982, this Court finds, Edward 
Riche legally purchased all right, title and interest Dr. Nilsson1s 
bankrupt estate had in the 1,000 shares of the North Ogden Profes-
sional Corporation. 
20. Therefore, after the purchase on August 12, 1982, 
Edward Riche was entitled under the Redemption Agreement and/or 
Code Section 16-11-13, to have his shares redeemed for reasonable 
fair market value. 
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21. Prior to the Bankruptcy Court's sale of the 1,000 
shares to plaintiff, Edward Riche, no determination or value 
regarding the restriction or encumbrances relating to the Stock 
Redemption Agreement was made. As a result of the purchase 
by plaintiff, Edward Riche, the Bankruptcy Court assigned all 
its right, title and interest to plaintiff and left this Court 
the right and responsibility to determine the value, encumbrances 
and/or restrictions, if any, with regard to the Stock Redemption 
Agreement. 
22. Within appropriate time limits provided under 
bhe Stock Redemption Agreement and/or Code Section 16-11-13, 
\ttorney John P. Sampson, on behalf of plaintiff, Edward Riche, 
nade demand for the redemption of his shares for then-reasonable 
narket value. 
23. No reasonable market value was tendered by defend-
mt under the Stock Redemption Agreement nor under the terms 
ind conditions of Code Section 16-11-13. Reasonable market 
ralue means 49.75% of all assets including, but not limited 
.of furniture and fixtures, office equipment, supplies, medical 
>araphernalia and accounts receivable less the costs of operating 
he clinic at any given time. 
24. There has been no redemption under the terms 
f the Stock Redemption Agreement, or under the provisions of 
ode Sec. 16-11-13. Therefore, under the terms of the Redemption 
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Agreement and Code Section 16-11-13 this Court concludes that 
all the evidence mandates that dissolution is the only viable 
solution under Utah law. Under the terms of the Stock Redemption 
Agreement and the Utah Professional Corporation Act, the plaintiff 
may not continually maintain ownership of the 1,000 shares of 
North Ogden Professional Corporation stock. 
25. This Court concludes that the statute of limitations 
does not bar either party regarding their relative assertions. 
This Court concludes that the Trustee, during the bankruptcy 
period, had each party's contentions and assertions in litigation 
and, therefore, the statutory period of limitations was suspended 
during the bankruptcy period until the time of the sale and 
a reasonable period thereafter. 
26. The plaintiff, under the terms of Code Section 
16-11-13, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees to be determined 
by the parties by means of affidavit and/or a subsequent special 
hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The enactment of the Utah Professional Corporation 
Act was not intended to create any form of exemption beyond 
the exemption statutes of the State of Utah. Thus, a professional 
stock interest is subject to all normal bankruptcy statutes 
and creditor rights. 
2. This Court concludes that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement as a matter of law was ambiguous for the reasons stated 
-8-
above and that par value as defined in the Stock Redemption 
Agreement meant reasonable market value. Furthermore, Code 
Section 16-11-13 also applies and required a redemption of plain-
tiff's 1,000 shares at reasonable market value * 
3. Plaintiff, Edward Riche, as a result of the purchase, 
Dwns all right, title and interest in the 1,000 shares of North 
Dgden Professional Corporation stock; that plaintiff1s demand 
for redemption at a reasonable fair value was made timely under 
the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement and/or including 
^ode Section 16-11-13. 
4. That the appropriate steps for redemption were 
aot taken by defendant according to the terms of the Stock Redemp-
tion Agreement nor under provisions of Code Section 16-11-13. 
5. Since no redemption was made,the plaintiff is 
entitled to an Order from this Court to have defendant immediately 
dissolved, to have all the assets marshalled, accounted for, 
legal liabilities paid and the balance of the assets distributed 
to the shareholders in the same ratio as their respective stock 
Dwnerships reflect, which are as follows: Dr. Michaelson, 1,000 
shares, Dr. Paul 10 shares, plaintiff Edward Riche,1,000 shares. 
6. Let judgment be entered against defendant for 
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs as determined and 
provided for in the Findings of Fact. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /°\, day of September, 
1984, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, to Herschel J. 
Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr., WATKISS & CAMPBELL, 310 South 
Main Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and to Pete 
N. Vlahos, VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 
84401. 
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 m ' < OF 
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL, CO-?. 
We, the undersigned incorporators, being persons legally 
competent to enter into contracts, for the purpose of forming 
a corporation under the laws of the State of Utah, do hereby 
adopt the following Articles of Incorporation: 
ARTICLE I 
The name of the proposed corporation is: NORTH OGDEN 
PROFESSIONAL, CORP. 
ARTICLE I I 
The name of the incorporators, who are also the original 
shareholders, and their places of residence are: 
Richard E. Hi Isson," K.D. 1012 East 3100 North Ocden, Utah 
David W. Paul, M.D.* 2823 North 550 East Ogden, Utah 
Chauncey D. Michaelson, M.D. 681 East 3125 North Occ'en, Utah 
ARTICLE III 
The time of duration of this corporation is perpetual, 
subject to dissolution as authorized by law. 
ARTICLE IV 
The purpose for which the corporation is organized is to encage 
in the practice of medicine, and perform services ancillary thereto, 
to accomplish these objectives, the corporation shall have the po'-<er 
(a) To make all contracts necessary and proper to effect 
its purposes and conduct its authorized business; to 
own real and personal property necessary or appro-
priate for the practice of medicine; to invest its 
funds in real estate, mortgages, stocks, bonds zr>d 
any other type of investments; to hold property, 
including shares of its cv/n stock, in trust as 
Trustee for stockholders of the corporation or others; 
to participate as a partner in any partnership alleged 
by law. 
- I H H G ro J J o Oi-S-•!;•;•: 
(b) To hire, encage, employ.or associate nodical practi-
tioners duly licensed under state law to practice 
medicine, and other employees necessary to carry cut 
the purposes of the corporation, 
(c) To do all things to the same extent and as fully as 
natural persons now do or could do in their place; 
to do all things and engage in all lawful transac-
tions which a professional corporation organized 
or existing under the laws of the State of Utah 
might do or engage in, even though not expressly 
stated herein. 
ARTICLE V 
The address of the initial registered office of the corporation 
shall-be 2252 North ^00 East, Weber County, 
State of Utah , and the initial registered 
agent shall be Richard £*. Nilsson . A place of business and 
branch offices for the conducting or carrying on of any portion 
of the business may be established in any state, territory, or 
possession of the United States of America in which a professional 
corporation haying the above described powers can legally function, 
and the corporation may'.have one office or more than one office 
and keep the books of the corporation outside the State of Utah. 
ARTICLE VI 
The corporation will not commence business until consideration 
of the value of at least One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) has 
been received for the issuance of stock. 
ARTICLE V!I 
The capital stock of the corporation shall amount to Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) divided into Fifty Thousand shares of 
Common Stock at One Dollar l^l.OOJ par value. At such tine as the 
Board of Directors may by resolution direct, said capital stock 
shall be paid into the corporation either in cash or by the sale 
and transfer to i t of real or personal property and any other 
valuable right or thing for the use and purpose of the said 
corporation, in payment for which shares of the capital stock 
of the corporation will be issued and the capital stock so issued 
shall thereupon and thereby become and be fully paid-up and non-
assessable forever, and in the absence of actual fraud in the 
transactions, the judgment of the Board of Directors as to the 
value of the property purchased shall be conclusive. The corp-
oration by the action of its stockholders, is authorized to increase, 
decrease or reclassify its stock, or to recall the same. in 
addition to its capital stock, the Corporation may accept additional 
cash or property as paid-in surplus. 
ARTICLE VIII 
The number of Directors, initially is three (3). The number, 
however, can be increased by a majority vote of the stockholders 
at any regular stockholder's meeting. The number of officers is 
three (3) and shall consist of a President, a Vice-President and a 
Secretary-Treasurer. The qualifications of the officers, other 
than the Secretary-Treasurer, are. that they be stockholders in the 
corporation and a director of the corporation. The following 
named persons shall constitute. the Board of Directors until their 
successors QCC elected and have qualified: 
Richard E. Hi Is son, M.D. 
David W. Paul, M.O. 
Chauncey D. Michaclson, M.D. 
The Directors' term of office shall be for one (l) year, and 
each director shall hold his office until his successor is elected 
and qualified. The time for the election of directors is at the 
annual meeting of the stockholders of the corporation. The manner 
in which directors are to be elected is by a majority vote of the 
stockholders present and voting. Each stockholder shall be entitled 
to as many votes as he holds shares of the capital stock, and repre-
sentation by proxy, duly appointed in writing, shall be allowed at 
all meetings of the stockholders, 'whether annual or special. A 
director may be removed during his term of office by a majority vote 
of the stockholders at any regular meeting or special meeting called 
for that purpose. 
The persons holding the office of President and Vice-President 
shall be medical doctors licensed to practice in Utah, and shall be 
appointed by and shall hold their office at the pleasure of the Board 
of Directors. The Secretary-Treasurer shall be appointed by and held 
his office at the pleasure of the Board of Directors. The Secretary-
Treasurer shall be appointed by and hold his office at the pleasure of 
the Board of Directors. A two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of the Board 
of Directors shall be necessary to remove an officer, but removal by a 
two-thirds (2/3) majority vote may be immediate and without notice to 
the officer, if in the discretion of the Board of Directors immediate 
removal is in the best interests of the corporation. 
form a quorum and be authorized to transact the business and 
exercise the corporate powers of Che corporation. 
ARTICLE X 
Within five (5) days after the election of the Beard c; 
Directors each year, they shall hold a directors1 meeting cr.d elect 
a President, a Vice-President, and a Secretary-Treasurer. The 
Following persons shall hold the following offices until the first 
meeting of the Board of Directors: 
President Chauncey D. Michaelson, M.D. 
631 East 3125 North Ogden, Utah 
Vice-President David W. Paul, M.D. 
2829 North 550 East Ogden, Utah 
Secretary-Treasurer Richard E. Nilsson, M.D. 
1012 East 3100 North Ogden, Utah 
ARTICLE XI 
The private or individual property of the stockholders shall 
not be liable for the obligations of the corporation, except for 
liability arising cut of the professional relationship between doctor 
and patient when the corporation fails to maintain professional liabili 
insurance in an amount sufficient to cover such obligations. 
ARTICLE XI I 
The transfer and conveyance of this stock shall be restricted 
in that such stock may be issued, sold or transferred only to a 
person or persons who are duly licensed to render medical services; 
any other transfer or issuance of shares shall be void. 
Upon the death or disqualification of a shareholder, the scores 
of the deceased or disqualified may be handled pursuant to the ?rov*»slc 
of the Professional Service Corporation Ace of the Utah Code. 
ARTICLE XIII 
In carrying on the business of the corporation, the Board of 
Directors is authorized and empowered to sell, exchange, mortgage, 
bond or otherwise dispose of, deal with and encumber any or all of 
the property of the corporation, upon such terms and conditions as such 
Board of Directors may deem just and proper and for the best interests 
of the corporation, without prior authorization or subsequent confirm-
ation by a vote of the stockholders or otherwise. 
ARTICLE XIV 
No contract or other transaction between this corporation and 
any other corporation shall be affected by the fact that a Director 
or officer of this corporation is interested in or is a Director or 
officer of such other corporation; and any Director, individually or 
jointly, may be a party to or may be interested in any corporation, 
or transaction of this corporation or in which this corporation is 
interested; and no contract or other transaction of this corporation 
with any/^.jrqon, firm or corporation shall be affected by the fact 
that any Director of this corporation is a party to or is interested 
in such contract, act or transaction or any way connected with such 
person, firm or corporation, and every person who may become a Director 
of this corporation is hereby relieved from liability that might 
otherwise exist fro-m contracting with the corporation for the benefit 
of himself or any firm, association or corporation in which he may be 
In any way interested, provided said Director acts in good faith. 
^ / ^ ^ - -
.RIchard £. Ni Isson, M. 0. 
.•^  
A l l J 
David W. Paul , M.O. 
_____ y—n- ^ 
Chauncey 0. M j-'chael son , ' M . D. 
1, the undersigned, a Notary Public hereby certify that 
personally appeared before me, and being duly sworn by me, severally 
declared that they are the persons who signed the foregoing document as 
Incorporators and that the statements therein contained are true. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 
day of 
Notary Public, Residing in 
Ky Commission Expires 
•* Q1 
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
STOCK REDEMPTION AGREEMENT 
AGREEHEIsT made this first day of July, 1970, by and 
between Richard E. Nilsson, M.D., Chauncey D. Michaelson, M.D. , 
and David W. Paul, M.D., hereinafter called the "Stockholders11 
nd the North Ogden Professional Corporation hereinafter called 
the "Company11. 
WHEREAS, the. Stockholders own stock in the Company 
as follows: 
STOCKHOLDER COMMON STOCK. 
Richard E. Milsson, M,D. 1,000 shares 
Chauncey D. Michaelson, M.D, 1,000 shares 
David W. Paul, M.D. ]0 shares 
and desire to express their agreement regarding their rights and 
obligations as Stockholders of the Company; and, 
WHEREAS, the Stockholders and the Company desire to provide 
an arrangement whereby in the event of the death of any one of the 
Stockholders, the survivors of then shall own the Company, 
IT IS TIIKREFQRE AGREED: 
• 1. Restriction on Stock. If anv Stockholder at anv tirr.e 
desires to sell, encumber, or otherwise dispose of any of his stock 
of the Company, or if any Stockholder shall terminate his employment 
by the Company, he shall offer all his stock to the Company at par 
value by written notice addressed to the principal office of the 
Company. 
A Stockholder shall be deemed to have terminated his employ-
ment at the end of four (4) months continuous absence from the business 
without approval and shall be deemed to have made written offer of his 
stock to the Company at the expiration of such period,- excluding 
absences with the permission and consent of the Company. Within thirty 
(30) days after receipt of such offer, trie Company may deliver written 
notice of acceptance of such offer to the offering Stockholder ac his 
residence, fixing a closing date for the purchase of the stock not 
more than thirty (30) cays thereafter, or, alternatively the Company 
may within such period deliver written notice to the offering Stockholder 
that it is being dissolved and liquidated. If the Company elects either 
of these courses, the offering Stockholder shall vote and take any other 
necessary action in accordance with the vote of the remaining Stockholders 
(or, if there is more than-one remaining Stockholder, the Stockholder or 
Stockholders owning a majority of the remaining voting stock), so as to 
effectuate the will of the Company. It is expressly stipulated, however, 
that the Company shall have the right not to pursue either of these 
courses, in which event the offering Stockholder may dispose of his 
stock to any other physician approved by the Company who is employed by 
the Company, free of the restrictions of this agreement: or, alternatively, 
he may call a meeting of the Stockholders and Directors, within sixty (60) 
doys after the Company's receipc of the original offer, at which he 
m y vote all the shares of the Company held by him and by the other-
S cckholders in favor of immediate dissolution, the offering Stock-
holder being deemed to hold a proxy for this purpose. 
2. Death of Stockholder. After the death of any one of 
the Stock-holders while owning stock in the Company, the Company shall 
be dissolved unless it shall elect to purchase at par value all the 
stock of the Company ow~ned by the decedent at the time of his death, 
giving written notice of its election to the executors or administra-
tors of the decedent, hereinafter called the personal representatives, 
and to the decedentrs surviving widow, within sixty (60) days after 
appointment of such personal representatives. In the event the Company 
elects to purchase the stock of the decedent, it shall fix a closing 
date not more than thirty (30) days after its giving of the foregoing 
notice, and the personal representatives of the decedent and the dece-
dent's widow shall be obliged to sell their stock on the terms herein-
after provided. The personal representatives of the deceased Stockholder 
and his surviving widow shall vote and take any other necessary action 
in accordance with the vote of the remaining Stockholder (or if there 
is more than one remaining stockholder, the Stockholder or Stockholders 
owning a majoricy of the remaining voting stock), so as to effectuate the 
will of the Company. 
3. Free Transferability of Stock. A Stockholder nay transfer 
all or any portion of his stock to any person qualified by the Articles 
o: Incorporation to be a stockholder; provided, however, tha. the Stock-
holder desiring to transfer all or any portion of his shares first 
shall advise the* Company of the proposed transfer. Prior to any such 
sale, the Company shall have the option to redeem the said stock at 
the par value. If said option is not exercised by the Company within 
fifteen (15) days after notice to it of the proposed sale, the Stock-
holder shall be free to sell said stock to said transferee. 
4. Purchase Price, For the purpose of Paragraph. 1 and 2 
above, the purchase price of all the stock of the Company shall be par 
value. 
5, Payment of Purchase Price. Payment of the purchase price-
to be paid by the Company for the stock of a Stockholder in the circum-
stances provided for in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be made as follows: 
(a) In case of a purchase under Paragraph 1, at the options 
of the Company either in a lump sum on the closing or one-third (1/3) 
shall be paid at the closing fixed by the Company, the balance in two (2) 
equal non-interest bearing installments payable six (6) months and 
twelve (12) months respectively, after the closing; payment must be made 
in cash. 
(b) In case of a purchase under Paragraph 2, the entire amount 
shall be paid at the closing fixed by the Company in a lump sum or in not 
to exceed five (5) equal non-interest bearing installments, the first paya-
ble at the closing and succeeding installments payable six (6), twelve. (12), 
eighteen (13), and twenty-four (2-'0 months after such closing. 
If the surplus of the Company is insufficient for the Company to 
purchase its stock, the Company and its officers and stockholders shall 
promptly take all necessary steps to reduce the capital stock of the 
Company to the extent required. 
6- Obligations Pending; Payment. Pending full payment of the 
purchase price as provided for in Paragraph A above: 
(a) The sellers or their personal representatives shall deposit 
their scock at the closing with an escrow agenc of his, or their, choice, 
deliverable against final payment. 
(h) The Company's policies and operations shall be governed by 
the following: (1) the nature of the Company's business will noz be 
altered, and Such business will be conducted and property will be sold, and 
commitments made, only in the ordinary course; (2) no dividend or other 
distributions will be declared or paid; (3) the level of compensation 
paid employees or officers shall noc be increased unless warranted bv 
increased business. 
7- Endorsement on Stock Certificates. During the continuance of 
this agreement, all stock certificates of the Company shall beat an endorse-
ment as follows: 
This certificate is held subject to the terms of an 
agreement, dated the day of 19 , a cony of which 
is on file at the principal office of the Conoanv in Oden 
Utah. ' ° 
8
' Arbitration. Any controversy arising under this agreement 
shall be settled in Ogden, Utah, by arbitration under the rules chen 
existing of tl\c American Arbitration Association; provided, however, that 
arbitration will not be exclusive remedy: and if the parties must retain 
attorneys to resolve such controversy, the party determined to be at 
fault or in breach shall pay all reasonable attorney's fees of the other 
party. 
9. Benefit. This agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit 
of the parties, their personal representatives, successors and assigns. 
IN WITNESS V7KERE0F,' the parties have executed this instrument 
the day and year first above written. 
STOCKHOLDERS 
Richard' E. Nilsson s l * 
Cftauftcey D. Micliaels'on 'v 
/ 
i W ^ rO (7 LX' 
David W. Paul 
COMPAQ 
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONS CORPORATION 
Chauncey D./MichaeisonV President 
ATTEST: 
7 
•'W.-^t 
Richard E. N i l s son , M.D. 
.Secretary 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Regular October Term, 1988 January 11, 1989 
Edward A. Riche, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
North Ogden Professional 
Corporation, a Utah 
Professional Corporation, 
Defendant and Petitioner* 
No. 880443 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been considered, and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered 
bhat a Writ of Certiorari be, and the same is, granted as prayed. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this V 
T 
day of February, 
1989, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid and 
addressed to the following: 
John P. Sampson 
Attorney for Respondent 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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